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NOTES
Dronenburg v. Zech: The Wrong Case for Asserting A Right of
Privacy for Homosexuals
In 1965 the Supreme Court decided Griswold v. Connecticut' and opened
the courts to litigation over constitutional protection for a right of privacy.2 As
subsequent cases extended the right of privacy to new areas of human activity,3
the parameters of the doctrine grew with no clear bounds.4 Advocates of homo-
sexual rights seized on this unstructured development5 as a promising constitu-
tional foundation on which to anchor protection for homosexual individuals
throughout society,6 only to be disappointed in their early efforts.7
In the armed services homosexual persons faced the most rigid institutional
discrimination.8 Prior to 1973 most challenges to the military's prohibition of
homosexuality involved individuals who were not admitted homosexuals and
whose cases turned on procedural questions. 9 More recent attacks have claimed
constitutional protection for persons admitting homosexual preference or con-
duct. 10 These attacks have had limited success; 1 most courts point to the spe-
1. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
2. Notes On Privacy: Constitutional Protection for Personal Liberty, 48 N.Y.U. L. Rnv. 670
(1973) [hereinafter cited as Notes on Privacy]. The concept of a guaranteed right to privacy first was
considered seriously in Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARv. L. REv. 193 (1890). See
Lasson, Homosexual Right" The Law in Flux and Conflict, 9 U. BALT. L. REV%. 47, 52 (1979).
3. See, eg., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (abortion); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438
(1972) (contraceptives); see also infra notes 40-52 and accompanying text (equal protection basis for
privacy); infra notes 67-78 and accompanying text (substantive due process basis for privacy).
4. Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 684-85 (1977) (Court recognized that it has
not marked the outer limits of the privacy right).
5. See Notes on Privacy, supra note 2, at 673, 720.
6. The Kinsey Institute for Sex Research reported that as of 1977 approximately 9.13% of the
American population had had more than an incidental homosexual experience. Rivera, Our
Straight-Laced Judges: The Legal Position of Homosexual Persons in the United States, 30 HAs-
TINGS L.. 799, 800 n.4 (1979) (citing Letter from Paul H. Gebhard, Kinsey Institute for Sex Re-
search (Mar. 18, 1977)). Professor Rivera notes that "homosexual" should be used as an adjective
rather than as a noun because "a person's sexual preference is but one part of his or her character."
Id. at 804.
7. See Note, Expanding the Right of Sexual Privacy, 27 Loy. L. REv. 1279, 1284 n.34 (1981);
Notes on Privacy, supra note 2, at 720.
8. See Rivera, Recent Developments in Sexual Preference Law, 30 DRAKE L. REv. 311, 319-20
(1980); Comment, Employment Discrimination in the Armed Services-An Analysis of Recent Deci-
sions Affecting Sexual Preference Discrimination in the Military, 27 VILL. L. REv. 351 (1981).
Although it is difficult to estimate, "[s]ociological data indicate that approximately thirty percent of
servicemembers can be classified as 'homosexuals' under the armed forces regulations." Id. at 353.
9. See Rivera, supra note 6, at 841; Comment, Homosexual Conduct in the Military: No Fag-
gots in Military Woodpiles, 1983 AiRz. ST. L.J. 79, 80 n.4; Comment, supra note 8, at 355-56; see also
Clackum v. United States, 296 F.2d 226 (Ct. CI. 1960) (servicewoman entitled to recover back pay
when she received no predischarge hearing on homosexual charges).
10. See Rivera, supra note 6, at 841; Comment, supra note 8, at 356.
11. See, eg., benShalom v. Secretary of the Army, 489 F. Supp. 964 (E.D. Wis. 1980) (Army
regulations on homosexual status found unconstitutional); Matlovich v. Secretary of the Air Force,
23 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1251 (D.D.C. 1980) (Air Force failed to justify regulations on
homosexuality). But cf. Rich v. Secretary of the Army, 735 F.2d 1220 (10th Cir. 1984) (Army
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cial needs of the military 12 as restricting their consideration of constitutional
protection for homosexual persons. 13
In Dronenburg v. Zech, 14 however, a panel of the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit flatly denied that there is any con-
stitutional haven for homosexuals under the right-of-privacy doctrine. 1 In af-
firming the discharge of Petty Officer Dronenburg, 16 the court gave only cursory
attention to the military context of the case.17 By limiting the right of privacy to
marriage and traditional family relationships, 18 Dronenburg reaches beyond the
treatment of homosexuals in the armed services and threatens to slam the door
on any assertion by homosexual men and women of a right of privacy.
The facts in Dronenburg were undisputed. 19 For nine years Dronenburg
built an unblemished Navy service record as a Korean linguist and cryptogra-
pher.20 In August 1980 the Navy began an investigation of Dronenburg, based
on sworn statements by a seaman recruit implicating Dronenburg in several ho-
mosexual acts on the Navy base.2 1 After a hearing before a Navy Administra-
tive Discharge Board in which Dronenburg admitted the allegations, the Board
recommended his discharge for "misconduct due to homosexual acts."122 The
discharge of homosexual serviceman for fraudulent enlistment upheld); Watkins v. United States
Army, 721 F.2d 687 (9th Cir. 1983) (absent showing that Army prohibition on homosexuality is
unconstitutional, court cannot force Army to retain avowed homosexual officer); Hatheway v. Secre-
tary of the Army, 641 F.2d 1376 (9th Cir.), cert denied, 454 U.S. 864 (1981) (court-martial based on
charges of sodomy upheld); Beller v. Middendorf, 632 F.2d 788 (9th Cir. 1980) (Army regulations
prohibiting homosexual conduct upheld), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 905 (1981); infra notes 136-68 and
accompanying text (cases involving homosexual status within military generally prove more success-
ful than those involving homosexual conduct).
12. See infra notes 87-105 and accompanying text.
13. See, eg., Rich v. Secretary of the Army, 735 F.2d 1220, 1229 (10th Cir. 1984); Hatheway v.
Secretary of the Army, 641 F.2d 1376, 1382 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 864 (1981); Belier v.
Middendorf, 632 F.2d 788, 810-11 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 905 (1981). But cf. Mat-
thews v. Marsh, No. 82-0216 (D. Me. April 3, 1984) (where no actual homosexual conduct alleged,
mandatory rejection from ROTC program for person identifying herself as homosexual violated first
amendment), noted in 52 U.S.L.W. 2569 (April 17, 1984).
14. 741 F.2d 1388 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
15. Id. at 1389.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 1398.
18. Id. at 1395-96.
19. Brief for Appellees at 2, Dronenburg v. Zech, 741 F.2d 1388 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Opening
Brief for Appellant at 4, Dronenburg v. Zech, 741 F.2d 1388 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
20. Dronenburg received consistently high evaluations from his superiors and never was disci-
plined by the Navy for any misconduct until his discharge. Trained as a Korean language specialist,
Dronenburg provided services which apparently were so important that the Navy paid him a
$12,000 bonus to reenlist in 1979. Opening Brief for Appellant at 4-5, Dronenburg.
21. At the time these events occurred Dronenburg was 27 years old. The seaman recruit who
reported the incidents was 19 years old and was a fellow student of Dronenburg's at the Defense
Language Institute. See Dronenburg, 741 F.2d at 1389.
22. Id. at 1389. Dronenburg's discharge was based on his violation of SEC/NAV Instruction
1900.9C (Jan. 20, 1978). These regulations later were replaced by SEC/NAV Instruction 1900.9D
(Mar. 12, 1981), which implemented a Department of Defense Directive, now codified at 32 C.F.R.
§ 41, Appendix A, Part 1 H (1984). The relevant portion of SEC/NAV Instruction 1900.9C stated
that "[a]ny member [of the Navy] who solicits, attempts or engages in homosexual acts shall nor-
mally be separated from the naval service. The presence of such a member in a military environment
seriously impairs combat readiness, efficiency, security and morale." This policy is continued by
Instruction 1900.9D. Dronenburg, 741 F.2d at 1389 n.1.
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Secretary of the Navy reviewed the case at Dronenburg's request and granted an
honorable discharge, effective April 21, 1981.23 Dronenburg filed suit in the
United States District Court for the District of Columbia alleging that the
Navy's mandatory policy of discharging homosexuals "solely on the basis of
their sexual orientation, without regard to individual fitness to serve," 24 violated
Dronenburg's constitutional rights of privacy and equal protection. 25 The dis-
trict court granted summary judgment for the Navy;26 Dronenburg appealed to
the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.27
In his opinion for the court Judge Bork dealt summarily with issues of regu-
latory interpretation2 8 and jurisdiction29 before giving attention to the right-of-
privacy issue.30 The bulk of the opinion analyzes past Supreme Court decisions
involving the right-of-privacy doctrine 31 in an attempt to discern whether the
right encompasses homosexual conduct.32 The court claimed not to have relied
on the "somewhat ambiguous precedent" 33 of Doe v. Commonwealth's Attor-
ney,34 in which a state antisodomy law was found not to violate the right of
privacy. The Dronenburg court, however, indicated that "[i]f a statute proscrib-
ing homosexual conduct in a civilian context is sustainable, then such a regula-
tion is certainly sustainable in a military context."' 35 In evaluating the Supreme
Court's major privacy cases, the court of appeals emphasized the lack of gui-
23. Dronenburg, 741 F.2d at 1389.
24. Opening Brief for Appellant at 1, Dronenburg.
25. Dronenburg, 741 F.2d at 1389.
26. The district court's opinion was not published.
27. Dronenburg, 741 F.2d at 1389. The three-member panel hearing Dronenburg's appeal in-
cluded Judge David W. Williams, Senior Judge from the United States District Court for the Central
District of California, and Judges Antonin Scalia and Robert H. Bork of the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.
28. Judge Bork found that discharge for homosexual conduct was not "invariably mandatory."
Id. at 1389 n.l. Dronenburg had argued that the regulations were, in practice, mandatory for all
active homosexual service members. Opening Brief for Appellant at 7-8, Dronenburg. Dronenburg
later relied on this argument to claim that the regulations were overly broad. Id. at 47-50.
Dronenburg also attempted to demonstrate that the Navy's distinction between discharge for
homosexual "conduct" as opposed to homosexual "status" was meaningless. Id. at 10-12. Judge
Bork, however, apparently sided with the Navy's narrower definition of the issue and found that the
regulations involved homosexual conduct.
29. Primarily following its own decision in Matlovich v. Secretary of the Air Force, 591 F.2d
852 (D.C. Cir. 1978), the court determined that it had jurisdiction to decide the constitutionality of a
military discharge. Dronenburg, 741 F.2d at 1390-91.
30. The opinion recoguized Dronenburg's constitutional arguments as based on both the right
of privacy and equal protection. It stated that "[r]esolution of the second argument is to some extent
dependent upon that of the first," and spent little time on the equal protection argument.
Dronenburg, 741 F.2d at 1390.
31. Id. at 1391-95; see infra notes 37-55 and accompanying text.
32. Dronenburg, 741 F.2d at 1391.
33. Id. at 1392.
34. 425 U.S. 901 (1976). The Supreme Court summarily affirmed the district court's opinion in
Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney, 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975) (state law prohibiting sodomy
upheld as constitutional), aff'd mem, 425 U.S. 901 (1976). It was the Supreme Court's summary
aflirmance that led Judge Bork in Dronenburg to view the Doe decision as an ambiguous one. De-
spite Judge Bork's denial of reliance on Doe, however, he cited cases holding that a summary affirm-
ance is a decision on the merits and binding on lower courts. Dronenburg, 741 F.2d at 1392; see
infra notes 118-21 and accompanying text.
35. Dronenburg, 741 F.2d at 1392.
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dance provided to lower courts in determining which claims fall within constitu-
tional privacy protection. 3
6
In the court of appeals' view, Griswold v. Connecticut 37 -the seminal right-
of-privacy case-had discussed a general right of privacy within the "'zones' "
or "'penumbras'" of various amendments, 38 but articulated nothing concrete
about the protection of privacy except that privacy protects the right of a hus-
band and wife to use contraceptives. 39 The court quickly disposed of Loving v.
Virginia 40 as an opinion deriving from the equal protection clause the right of
people from different racial groups to marry.4 1 The court also classified Eisen-
stadt v. Baird42 as an equal protection case. 43 Relying on Griswold, the Eisen-
stadt Court had reasoned that no rational purpose justified allowing distribution
of contraceptives to married persons but not to unmarried persons.44 The
Dronenburg court cited language from Eisenstadt that emphasized the impor-
tance of individual choice in matters of procreation, 45 but found no criteria on
which it could rely to apply Eisenstadt to future privacy cases. 46 Roe v. Wade 47
gave a fuller explanation of the right-of-privacy doctrine,48 but the Dronenburg
36. Id.
37. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
38. Dronenburg, 741 F.2d at 1392 (quoting Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484). The Dronenburg court
discussed only Justice Douglas' Opinion for the Court in Griswold, one of four opinions written in
favor of the holding.
39. Id. Although Douglas stressed the sanctity of marital privacy in Griswold, his opinion was
based broadly on the emanations of several specific guarantees of the constitution-including the
first amendment right of association, the third amendment protection against quartering soldiers, the
fourth amendment right against unreasonable searches and seizures, and the fifth amendment right
against forced self-incrimination. See Griswold, 381 U.S at 484.
40. 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (state antimiscegenation statute that prevented Whites from marrying
Blacks and Indians held unconstitutional).
41. Dronenburg, 741 F.2d at 1393. The court noted that Loving involved a brief due process
analysis and a recognition of marriage as a constitutional right, but stated that Loving failed to offer
any support for Dronenburg's case. Id.
42. 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (statute prohibiting distribution of contraceptives to unmarried persons
held invalid).
43. Dronenburg, 741 F.2d 1393.
44. Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 447.
45. If under Griswold the distribution of contraceptives to married persons cannot be pro-
hibited, a ban on distrbution to unmarried persons would be equally impermissible. It is
true that in Griswold the right of privacy in question inhered in the marital relationship.
Yet the marital couple is not an independent entity with a mind and heart of its own, but
an association of two individuals each with a separate intellectual and emotional makeup.
If the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to
be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a
person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child.
Dronenburg, 741 F.2d at 1393 (quoting Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453).
46. Id. at 1393-94. The court overlooked two important aspects of Eisenstadt. The Eisenstadt
holding had extended a privacy right beyond marriage to encompass a socially unacceptable premar-
ital or extramarital relationship. The opinion also had held that the statute failed to meet a rational
relationship test, which requires a statute to bear a rational relation to a legitimate state purpose.
See Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238 (1976). The Dronenburg opinion treated this same rational
relationship test as a light burden for the Navy to satisfy. See Dronenburg, 741 F.2d at 1398.
47. 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (statutory prohibition of abortion held unconstitutional).
48. The Dronenburg court quoted the Roe opinion's recognition of a constitutional guarantee of
privacy for those personal rights that are deemed "'fundamental'" or "'implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty.'" Dronenburg, 741 F.2d at 1394 (quoting Roe, 410 U.S. at 152).
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court focused on Roe's limitations on privacy protection.49 The court claimed
that the Supreme Court had failed to articulate a guiding principle to inform
lower courts about the parameters of the right of privacy. 50 Finally, the opinion
mentions Carey v. Population Services International5 1 as holding that the Consti-
tution protects an individual's right to make" 'decisions in matters of childbear-
ing.' "52 Thus, the Dronenburg court discussed only marriage, procreation, and
family elements in analyzing these right-to-privacy cases.
In reviewing these major cases the court found no general principle "even
approaching in breadth" the right to homosexual conduct claimed by
Dronenburg. 53 The court of appeals refused to extend the right of privacy to
fact situations beyond those treated in the earlier cases-marriage, procreation,
contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and education 54-- stating,
"We would find it impossible to conclude that a right to homosexual conduct is
'fundamental' or 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty' unless any and all
private sexual behavior falls within those categories, a conclusion we are unwill-
ing to draw." 55
The best justification for the court's holding lies in its strict adherence to
principles of judicial restraint.56 Although it recognized that Supreme Court
decisions "create" constitutional protections that lower courts are bound to fol-
low, the court held that prior cases cointain no principle or methodology that
would justify protection for private, consensual homosexual conduct.57 The
49. Id. at 1394-95. The court, however, did not emphasize that in Roe the limits on the wo-
man's right to choose abortion arose from "compelling" state interests in protecting health and
potential life at certain times in the pregnancy. Under a strict scrutiny analysis, a court must find a
compelling interest before a statute can be allowed to infringe on fundamental rights. Roe, 410 U.S.
at 155.
50. Dronenburg, 741 F.2d at 1395.
51. 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (statute limiting distribution of contraceptives for persons over 16 years
of age to licensed pharmacists and completely denying contraceptives for persons under age 16 held
invalid).
52. Dronenburg, 741 F.2d at 1395 (quoting Carey, 431 U.S. at 687).
53. Id.
54. Id. The court noted the lack of guidance from outside sources and implied that it agreed
with the characterization of the right of privacy as a judge-created right, wholly apart from the
Constitution. For an argument that constitutional interpretation must include broad recognition of
individual rights, see Richards, Sexual Autonomy and the Constitutional Right to Privacy: A Case
Study in Human Rights and the Unwritten Constitution, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 957, 958-64 (1979).
55. Dronenburg, 741 F.2d at 1396. The court referred to tests of whether a right is protected by
the due process clause from any restrictions outside a "compelling" state interest. See supra note 49.
In converting Dronenburg's argument to a larger issue involving "all private sexual behavior," the
court ignored limitations on the right of privacy for homosexual conduct that other opinions have
recognized. See, e.g., benShalom v. Secretary of the Army, 489 F. Supp. 964, 973 (E.D. Wis. 1980);
Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney, 403 F. Supp. 1199, 1204-05 (E.D. Va. 1975) (Merhige, J., dis-
senting), aff'd mere., 425 U.S. 901 (1976).
56. Dronenburg, 741 F.2d at 1396-97. Judge Bork admitted his personal view that no courts,
not even the Supreme Court, should create new constitutional rights apart from the text, structure,
and history of the Constitution. Id. at 1396 n.5. But see Dronenburg v. Zech, 746 F.2d 1579, 1580
(D.C. Cir. 1984) (Robinson, J., dissenting) ("We find particularly inappropriate the panel's attempt
to wipe away selected Supreme Court decisions in the name of judicial restraint."), denying reh'g to
741 F.2d 1388 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
57. Dronenburg, 741 F.2d at 1396-97. The court criticized Dronenburg's assertion that all mi-
nority views of morality are protected by the Constitution. The court seems to overstate
Dronenburg's position, which merely was that constitutional protection cannot be denied simply
1985]
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opinion briefly discusses the Navy regulation against homosexuality and found a
"rational relation"58 between the policy of discharging homosexuals and legiti-
mate military interests in maintaining discipline, good order, and morale.5 9 The
court, however, treated the particular facts of Dronenburg's case and the mili-
tary context in which the controversy arose as minor issues relative to its major
holding-that all private homosexual conduct falls outside constitutional protec-
tion of personal privacy.6 °
The Supreme Court has not developed the right-of-privacy doctrine with
thoroughgoing consistency.6 1 Earlier privacy decisions referred to various spe-
cific guarantees of liberty in the Constitution, trying to locate a doctrinal foot-
hold for the privacy protection. 62 In his majority opinion in Griswold, Justice
Douglas used a broad-based approach to the privacy interests protected by "em-
anations" from several amendments. 63 He noted the fourth and fifth amend-
ment bars to unreasonable governmental intrusion and found that the law
recognizes a right of privacy within the "marital bedroom." 64 Justice
Goldberg's concurring opinion based the right of privacy on the ninth amend-
ment's reservation of fundamental rights to the people. 65 The ambiguity created
by these competing theories in Griswold arose particularly from the majority's
attempt to avoid substantive due process as a foundation for its decision. 66
Substantive due process refers to the use of the due process clause in the
fifth and fourteenth amendments to protect certain unenumerated rights as guar-
because one's view of morality is a minority view. See Opening Brief for Appellant at 13,
Dronenburg.
58. The court followed Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238, 247-49 (1976), in finding that under an
equal protection analysis, if no fundamental right is infringed and no "suspect classification" is in-
volved, a statute need only pass a minimum level of review. If a law uses a suspect classification or
burdens a fundamental right, however, the court must use a stricter level of scrutiny. See Shapiro v.
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 658-63 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
59. Dronenburg, 741 F.2d at 1398. The court held that the rationality of the Navy regulations
is self-evident and that "[tihe Navy is not required to produce social science data on the results of
controlled experiments to prove what common sense and common experience demonstrate." Id.
60. Id.
61. See supra notes 3-4 and accompanying text. Justice Brandeis expounded his theory of pri-
vacy in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928):
The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions favorable to the pursuit of
happiness. They recognized the significance of man's spiritual nature, of his feelings and of
his intellect. They knew that only a part of the pain, pleasure and satisfaction of life are to
be found in material things. They sought to protect Americans in their beliefs, their
thoughts, their emotions and their sensations. They conferred, as against the Government,
the right to be let alone-the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by
civilized man.
Id. at 478 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
62. Notes on Privacy, supra note 2, at 671; see Roe, 410 U.S. at 153; Griswold, 381 U.S. at 481-86
(examining "specific guarantees").
63. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484; see supra notes 38-39.
64. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485. In Roe the Court cited a line of cases protecting the right of
privacy as against unreasonable searches and seizures. Roe, 410 U.S. at 152; see, e.g., Terry v. Ohio,
393 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1968); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350 (1967).
65. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 487 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
66. See Karst, The Freedom of Intimate Association, 89 YALE L.J. 624, 653 (1980). Justice
Stewart criticized the majority's invocation of substantive due process in Griswold, 381 U.S. at 527-
31 (Stewart, J., dissenting), but Justice Douglas denied the accusation. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 481-82.
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anteed "liberties."'67 Although the Supreme Court has condemned the use of
this doctrine to guarantee economic rights,68 it continues to apply substantive
due process analysis for personal liberties in privacy cases.69 The Griswold line
of cases had antecedents in early substantive due process decisions that had pro-
tected rights of educating 70 and raising71 children. Substantive due process then
provided the support for invalidating regulations concerning marriage,7 2 contra-
ception,73 procreation,74 and abortion.75 Throughout these cases the Supreme
Court has struggled to define "fundamental liberties" and "fundamental rights,"
but has reached no consensus. 76 The definition of "fundamental liberty" based
on traditions and "the collective conscience of the people" seems to block due
process claims by groups traditionally perceived by society as deviants.77 In Roe
v. Wade, however, the Supreme Court extended substantive due process protec-
tion to women choosing to have abortions, despite the existence of century-old
state laws prohibiting abortion practice.
78
To confuse the picture even further, in Stanley v. Georgia7 9 the Supreme
Court added a first amendment component to what the constitutional right of
privacy encompasses. 80 Apart from holding that the government could not un-
reasonably restrict the material a person reads or views in his or her own
67. See Notes on Privacy, supra note 2, at 671-72.
68. See Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 530-39 (1934); Notes on Privacy, supra note 2, at
671-72.
69. See Notes on Privacy, supra note 2, at 672; see also Roe, 410 U.S. at 168 (Stewart, J., concur-
ring) (accepting substantive due process as basis of Griswold).
70. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (denial of education in foreign language
unconstitutional).
71. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (denial of access to private school infringed
parents' right to raise child).
72. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
73. Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 538
(1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
74. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
75. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
76. See Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 694 n.17 (1977) ("We observe that the
Court has not definitely answered the difficult question whether and to what extent the Constitution
prohibits state statutes regulating [private consensual sexual] behavior."); Griswold, 381 U.S. at 493
(Goldberg, J., concurring) (To determine fundamental rights, judges must look to "the traditions
and collective conscience of the people."); see also Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 517 (1961) (Doug-
las, J., dissenting) ("Liberty" either emanates from the specific guarantees of the Constitution or
from experience in a free society.); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) ("Without doubt,
[guaranteed liberty] denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the indi-
vidual. . . generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the
orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.").
77. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 493, 498-99 (Goldberg, J., concurring) (excluding homosexuality
from protection as a fundamental liberty rooted in the traditions and conscience of society).
78. Roe, 410 U.S. at 139-41, 153.
79. 394 U.S. 557 (1969) (criminal statute penalizing the private possession of obscene material
held unconstitutional).
80. Although Stanley involved first amendment protection, the Supreme Court acknowledged
in Paris Adult Theater I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 66 (1973) its privacy basis for Stanley. The Paris
opinion limited Stanley to protection for "privacy of the home." Id. The Court upheld state prohi-
bition of obscene material in places of public accommodation, even for consenting adults. Id. at 69;
see Note, supra note 7, at 1286 n.47; see also Baker v. Wade, 553 F. Supp. 1121, 1141 n.53 (N.D.
Tex. 1982) (Stanley supported fundamental right of privacy within the home).
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home,81 Stanley indicated that the setting of an activity may determine the de-
gree of privacy protection given to such an activity. 82 In Griswold the Supreme
Court also indicated that the freedom of association8 3 guaranteed by the first
amendment would protect a privacy right.84 Thus, although substantive due
process remains the basic analytic framework for cases involving privacy
claims,85 the first amendment may offer additional protection for future
claimants.
8 6
In contrast with this line of privacy decisions is the Supreme Court's re-
cently developed method for reviewing administrative decisions within the
armed services.8 7 Since 1974, in a series of decisions in which military regula-
tions and practices have been challenged, 88 a majority of the Supreme Court has
accepted the idea that the armed services constitute a "separate community."89
Because of their mission, the services may place greater restrictions on individ-
ual liberty than those allowed in civilian life.90
In Parker v. Levy 9 1 the Court upheld the conviction of an army captain
court-martialed for "conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman." 92 The
Court's justification for a less stringent application of first amendment protec-
tion rested on the recognition of "[t]he fundamental necessity for obedience, and
the consequent necessity for the imposition of discipline, [which] may render
81. Stanley, 394 U.S. at 565.
82. See Note, supra note 7, at 1285; Notes on Privacy, supra note 2, at 733. Some opinions
imply that Stanley creates a right to privacy in one's home that would include masturbation as a
protected activity in the home. Presumably, defendant in Stanley used the obscene materials in his
home for sexual gratification. See Baker v. Wade, 553 F. Supp. 1121, 1141 (N.D. Tex. 1982).
83. Professor Karst has combined the right of privacy with the first amendment freedom of
association to argue for a right of "intimate association." Karst, supra note 66, at 657-58.
84. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 483 (citing NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958)).
85. See Notes on Privacy, supra note 2, at 673. The privacy cases follow a two-tiered standard
of review. First, the court considers whether the affected conduct constitutes a fundamental right.
If not, the court need only find a rational relation between the regulation and a permissible state
objective. If the regulation affects a fundamental right, the court applies strict scrutiny to the regula-
tion. Comment, supra note 9, at 102-03; see supra note 58.
86. See, eg., Rich v. Secretary of the Army, 735 F.2d 1220, 1229 (10th Cir. 1984) (citing Mat-
thews v. Marsh, No. 82-0216 (D. Me. April 3, 1984), noted in 52 U.S.L.W. 2569) (April 17, 1984).
87. For a general discussion of this development, see Hirschhorn, The Separate Community:
Military Uniqueness and Servicemen's Constitutional Rights, 62 N.C.L. REv. 178, 184-207 (1984).
88. See, eg., Chappell v. Wallace, 103 S. Ct. 2362 (1983) (enlisted members of the military
denied damages action against officers based on violations of constitutional rights); Rostker v.
Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981) (Military Selective Service Act requiring draft registration for males
but not for females upheld as constitutional); Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348 (1980) (Air Force
regulation prohibiting unauthorized circulation of petitions on base upheld); Middendorf v. Henry,
425 U.S. 25 (1976) (no sixth amendment right to counsel for Marine Corps' summary court-martial
proceeding); Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976) (Army prohibition on biased political speeches and
unapproved distribution of literature upheld); Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733 (1974) (Army discipli-
nary regulations did not violate due process).
89. See, eg., Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 743 (1974) ("This Court has long recognized that
the military is, by necessity, a specialized society separate from civilian society.").
90. See Hirschhorn, supra note 87, at 178.
91. 417 U.S. 733 (1974).
92. Id. at 757. The petitioner had harshly criticized the United States' involvement in the
Vietnam War and had urged minority soldiers not to fight. The Court held that the statute was not
unconstitutionally vague and that the Army had not violated petitioner's first amendment rights by
punishing him for his statements. Id. at 761.
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permissible within the military that which would be constitutionally impermissi-
ble outside it."93
In subsequent cases the Court has noted these unique needs of the military
and taken a position of "healthy deference" to administrative and legislative de-
cisions within the armed services. 94 The Court has not abandoned its power of
constitutional review in military cases, 95 but has applied a balancing test to
weigh the individual's interest against the potential interference that a successful
challenge to military policy would cause to the proper function96 of the armed
forces.97 A majority of the Supreme Court has deferred to military statutes or
regulations against individual claims arising under the first,98 fifth,99 sixth,100
and fourteenth amendments. 101
A minority of the Court 02 has criticized these decisions harshly for losing
sight of the Court's duty to protect the constitutional rights of all citizens.' 0 3
The dissenters in these recent armed forces cases insist on their responsibility to
"judge" the rule or decision in light of standard constitutional principles. 104 De-
93. Id. at 758. Critics such as Justice Brennan refer to such language as the "military neces-
sity" justification. See Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348, 369 (1980) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Greer v.
Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 852-53 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
94. Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 66 (1981); see also Middendorf v. Henry, 425 U.S. 25, 43
(1976) (constitutional authority to regulate land and naval forces entitles Congress to "particular
deference").
95. Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348, 349 (1980); Middendorf v. Henry, 425 U.S. 25, 50 (1976)
(Powell, I., concurring); Parker, 417 U.S. at 758.
96. In Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976), the Supreme Court stated that the basic purpose of
the military is to "train soldiers" rather than to provide a public forum for political candidates. Id.
at 837-38.
97. Hirschhorn, supra note 87, at 180. In his article, Professor Hirschhorn argues that the type
of judicial review that gives primacy to individual rights is not compatible with the constitutional
principle of the military as an instrument of the civilian population. He characterizes the armed
forces as
an example of a rational bureaucracy: a hierarchical organization characterized by a spe-
cialized division of labor.., in which each individual's role is to pursue goals established
by the heads of the hierarchy through methods that they have calculated will attain their
goals. In any such organization the needs and desires of an individual member may con-
flict with the demands of his role; if he chooses to follow the former, the functioning of the
organization is impeded.
Id. at 218-19.
98. Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348, 361 (1980) (Air Force regulation that required persons to
seek approval from commander before circulating petition held constitutional); Greer v. Spock, 424
U.S. 828, 839 (1976) (prohibition of candidates' speeches on military base to keep base politically
neutral was constitutional); Parker, 417 U.S. at 761 (court-martial for disrespectful language
upheld).
99. Middendorfv. Henry, 425 U.S. 25, 48 (1976) (lack of counsel at summary court-martial did
not violate either the fifth or the sixth amendments).
100. Id.
101. Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 66-67 (1981) (male-only draft did not violate equal pro-
tection clause).
102. Justices Brennan and Marshall consistently have criticized the majority's deferential stance
in military cases. See Hirschhorn, supra note 87, at 204-06.
103. Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 112 (1981) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
104. Justice Brennan warned in Brown:
To be sure, generals and admirals, not federal judges, are all expert about military needs.
But it is equally true that judges, not military officers, possess the competence and author-
ity to interpret and apply the First Amendment. . . . This Court abdicates its responsibil-
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spite these protests, the present Supreme Court seems prepared to uphold almost
all military regulations unless they are so unreasonable that they become arbi-
trary or capricious.105
As the Supreme Court battled within its ranks on issues relating to a consti-
tutional right of privacy10 6 and its stance toward the military as a "separate
community," 10 7 the lower courts, at both the state and federal level, began to
face the issue of homosexual rights.108 Initial attempts to establish and protect
the legal rights of homosexual persons met formidable barriers in state laws
prohibiting consensual sodomy. 10 9 After Griswold a majority of courts held that
the newly-recognized right of marital privacy protected married couples from
criminal sanctions for consensual sodomy. °10 In 1975, however, when a group
of homosexual males11' sought similar protection, the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Virginia refused to invalidate a Virginia statute
governing "crimes against nature." 112 In Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney113
the lower court relied heavily on dicta from past Supreme Court opinions1 14 that
implicitly approved of criminal sanctions for homosexuality. 115 The Doe opin-
ion limited constitutional protection under Griswold to marriage, home, or fam-
ily life116 and found "no authoritative judicial bar to the proscription of
homosexuality."'1 17 The Supreme Court summarily affirmed Doe, offering no
explanation for its decision. 118 Confusion continues to surround Doe, 19 partic-
ity to safeguard free expression when it reflexively bows before the shibboleth of military
necessity.
Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348, 370 (1980) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
105. See Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 840 (1976).
106. See supra notes 61-78 and accompanying text.
107. See supra notes 87-105 and accompanying text.
108. See Comment, supra note 8, at 352-53.
109. Until 1961 every state treated consensual sodomy between adults as a criminal act. See
Note, supra note 7, at 1281.
110. Id. at 1258 n.35; see, eg., Lovisi v. Slayton, 363 F. Supp. 620 (E.D. Va. 1973) (married
couple's conviction under sodomy law upheld because acts were performed in presence of a third
party), aff'd, 539 F.2d 349 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 977 (1976).
111. The case began as a class action on behalf of all homosexuals similarly situated. The court
then switched to joining petitioners' claims. Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney, 403 F. Supp. 1199,
1200 n.1 (E.D. Va. 1975), aff'd mer., 425 U.S. 901 (1976).
112. The Virginia statute, typical of many states' statutes, stated:
Crimes against nature-If any person shall carnally know in any manner any brute animal,
or carnally know any male or female person by the anus or by or with the mouth, or
voluntarily submit to such carnal knowledge, he or she shall be guilty of a felony and shall
be confined in the penitentiary not less than one year nor more than three years.
Id. at 1200 (quoting VA. CODE § 18.1-212 (1950)).
113. 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975), aff'd mer., 425 U.S. 901 (1976).
114. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 499 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring); Poe v. Ull.
man, 367 U.S. 497, 553 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
115. Doe, 403 F. Supp. at 1201-02. The Dronenburg opinion also cited these cases for the propo.
sition that the right of privacy does not protect homosexual conduct. Dronenburg, 741 F.2d at 1391
(citing Doe, 425 U.S. at 1200; Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 553 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting)).
116. Doe, 403 F. Supp. at 1202.
117. Id. In a vigorous dissent, Judge Merhige found ample judicial support for invalidating the
statute. Doe, 403 F. Supp. at 1203-05 (Merhige, J., dissenting).
118. Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney, 425 U.S. 901 (1976). Doe has been criticized as an
institutional decision by the Supreme Court not to write an opinion in this area. Karst, supra note
66, at 692. Although a summary affirmance is a vote on the merits of a case, Ohio ex rel. Eaton v.
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ularly because the Supreme Court stated, one year later, that it had not decided
the constitutionality of statutes regulating private consensual sex among
adults. 120 Despite the Supreme Court's unsettled position, several courts re-
cently have found ample constitutional grounds for invalidating state laws
prohibiting consensual sodomy. 12 1
Federal courts granted protection for homosexual employees of the federal
government even before states began invalidating their sodomy laws.1 22 In Nor-
ton v. Macy123 the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Coumbia
Circuit ruled that no federal employee could be dismissed solely because of pri-
vate homosexual conduct, unless the employer proved a "nexus" between the
conduct and job efficiency. 124 By 1975 the Civil Service Commission had re-
vised its regulations to incorporate the nexus requirement of Norton.'25 Other
homosexual employees in the public sector have sought and won constitutional
protection under the first amendment.' 2 6
Price, 360 U.S. 246, 247 (1959), and binds lower courts until otherwise informed by the Supreme
Court, Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 343-45 (1975), it may carry less weight than an adverse
decision on the merits, Port Auth. Bondholders Protective Comm. v. Port of New York Auth., 387
F.2d 259, 263 n.3 (2d Cir. 1967), cert denied, 391 U.S. 903 (1967).
119. See, e.g., Rich v. Secretary of the Army, 735 F.2d 1220, 1228 n.8 (10th Cir. 1984); Baker v.
Wade, 553 F. Supp. 1121, 1138 (N.D. Tex. 1982).
120. Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 688 n.5 (1977); see supra note 76. Plaintiffin
Dronenburg argued that the Supreme Court had affirmed Doe based on lack of standing since the
petitioners had not been convicted under the statute. See Dronenburg, 741 F.2d at 1392.
In addition, the Supreme Court recently faced the Doe issue in New York v. Uplinger, 104 S.
Ct. 2332 (1984). After oral argument, the Court vacated certiorari because the case was not an
appropriate "vehicle" for resolving the question of how far constitutional protection extends for
homosexual activity. Id. at 2334 (no precise constitutional question presented by court of appeals).
See Appellant's Petition for Rehearing with Suggestion of Rehearing en banc at 16, Dronenburg v.
Zech, 741 F.2d 1388 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
121. See Baker v. Wade, 553 F. Supp. 1121 (N.D. Tex. 1982) (sodomy statute violated constitu-
tional rights of homosexual persons); People v. Onofre, 51 N.Y.2d 476, 415 N.E.2d 936, 434
N.Y.S.2d 947 (1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 987 (1982) (because fundamental right of privacy pro-
tects homosexual behavior, sodomy statute invalid); Commonwealth v. Bonadio, 490 Pa. 91, 415
A.2d 47 (1980) (statute prohibiting sodomy between unmarried persons violated equal protection
rights). Both Baker and Onofre relied heavily on Stanley and Eisenstadt as proof that the right of
privacy extends beyond marriage and procreation cases. See Baker, 553 F. Supp. at 1141; Onofre, 51
N.Y.2d at 490, 415 N.E.2d at 940-41, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 952.
122. See Rivera, supra note 6, at 818; Comment, supra note 9, at 86.
123. 417 F.2d 1161 (D.C. Cir. 1969). Most commentators regard this case as the landmark
decision on rights of homosexual employees of the federal government. See Rivera, supra note 6, at
818. Interestingly, the same court that decided Dronenburg had decided Norton 15 years earlier.
124. Although the decision was based primarily on procedural due process, Judge Bazelon
clearly implied that a right to privacy existed for the petitioner. Norton, 417 F.2d at 1165.
125. 5 C.F.R. § 731.202(a) (1984) (person may be dismissed from federal employment only
when "this action will promote the efficiency of the service"); see Rivera, supra note 8, at 317-19.
126. See, eg., National Gay Task Force v. Board of Educ. of Oklahoma City, 729 F.2d 1270
(10th Cir. 1984) (portion of state statute allowing dismissal of teacher for advocating repeal of anti-
sodomy law violated first amendment protection), aff'd per curtam by an equally divided court, No.
83-2030 (U.S. March 26, 1985); Acanfora v. Board of Educ., 359 F. Supp. 843 (D. Md.) (teacher's
public statements about homosexual status protected but teacher denied relief on other grounds),
aff'd, 491 F.2d 498 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 836 (1974).
Justice Powell took no part in the Gay Task Force decision, which resulted in an evenly-divided
Court. The Court, however, failed to explain why it had chosen to decide Gay Task Force, but had
set for reargument the other cases that had been argued without Justice Powell's presence. Wall St.
J., March 27, 1985, at 17, col. 6. The Court apparently is avoiding a written opinion involving
homosexual rights.
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Attempts to establish rights for homosexual members of the military have
met stronger opposition.127 The armed services continue to follow their long-
standing policies 128 that "homosexuality is incompatible with military ser-
vice." 129 Courts often have avoided considering the constitutionality of the mili-
tary practice of discharging homosexuals1 30 by dismissing challenges to these
regulations for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.1 31 Doe v. Chafee132
triggered a series of recent cases in which admitted homosexuals have directly
attacked military discrimination.' 33 In Chafee the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California applied a "nexus" test,134 but found
against the Navy seaman because he admitted that his homosexual relationship
had affected his performance.13 5
Although some decisions have favored the homosexual person challenging
a specific discharge, 136 cases turning on the constitutionality of the regulation
have tended to uphold the military judgment.1 37 Matlovich v. Secretary of the
Air Force138 involved a fact situation strikingly similar to that in Dronenburg.139
127. See Rivera, supra note 8, at 319-20; Comment, supra note 8, at 351.
128. In 1949 the Department of Defense adopted a policy that treated known homosexual ser-
vicemembers as "military liabilities and security risks who must be eliminated." Comment, supra
note 8, at 354.
129. 32 C.F.R. § 41, app. A, pt. 1, at 25 (1984); see supra note 22. This Department of Defense
Directive to all armed sevices further states:
The presence in the military environment of persons who engage in homosexual conduct or
who, by their statements, demonstrate a propensity to engage in homosexual conduct, seri-
ously impairs the accomplishment of the military mission. . . .As used in this section:
Homosexual means a person, regardless of sex, who engages in, or intends to engage in
homosexual acts.
130. The Navy has claimed that although processing homosexual individuals for discharge is
mandatory, actual discharge is not. See Comment, supra note 9, at 87. Dronenburg argued that
discharge for practicing homosexual members is mandatory because by definition they do not fit the
exceptions for incidental homosexual behavior. Opening Brief for Appellant, supra note 19, at 7-8;
see supra note 28.
131. See, eg., Von Hoffburg v. Alexander, 615 F.2d 633 (5th Cir. 1980); Champagne v. Schles-
inger, 506 F.2d 979 (7th Cir. 1974); Heisel v. Chalbeck, 405 F. Supp. 361 (M.D. Fla. 1976); see
Comment, supra note 8, at 356-57.
132. 355 F. Supp. 112 (N.D. Cal. 1973).
133. See supra notes 9-10 and accompanying text.
134. Chafee, 355 F. Supp. at 115. The court followed the nexus requirement articulated in Nor-
ton v. Macy, 417 F.2d 1161, 1165 (D.C. Cir. 1969). See supra notes 122-25 and accompanying text.
135. Chafee, 355 F. Supp. at 115. Chafee felt that his relationship with his shipmate created too
much tension for him on board the ship.
136. Se4 eg., Matthews v. Marsh, No. 82-0216 (D.C. Me. April 3, 1984) (excluding person from
ROTC program without a showing of any homosexual activity violates first amendment), cited in
Rich v. Secretary of the Army, 735 F.2d 1220, 1229 (10th Cir. 1984); benShalom v. Secretary of the
Army, 489 F. Supp. 964 (E.D. Wis. 1980) (Army regulation permitting discharge of soldier for
homosexuality without proof of overt homosexual acts is unconstitutional); Matlovich v. Secretary
of the Air Force, 23 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1251 (D.D.C. 1980).
137. See, eg., Rich v. Secretary of the Army, 735 F.2d 1220 (10th Cir. 1984); Hatheway v.
Secretary of the Army, 641 F.2d 1376 (9th Cir.), cert denied, 454 U.S. 864 (1981); Belier v. Mid-
dendorf, 632 F.2d 788 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 905 (1981).
138. 23 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1251 (D.D.C. 1980).
139. Petitioner in Matlovich was an admitted homosexual with a 12 year record of excellent
military service. In contrast to Dronenburg, Matlovich was not charged with any homosexual activ-
ity on the base or with another serviceman. See Matlovich v. Secretary of the Air Force, 591 F.2d
852, 853-54 (D.C. Cir. 1978), on remand, 23 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1251 (D.D.C. 1980).
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Neither the appellate court"4 nor the district court on remand14 1 ever decided
the right-of-privacy issue raised by the case. Instead, the district court ordered
Matlovich reinstated because the Air Force had failed to demonstrate the exist-
ence of any fair and objective standards for considering discharge of a homosex-
ual.142 In benShalom v. Secretary of the Army' 43 the court dealt directly with a
constitutional challenge to military policy. 44 Although the court recognized its
obligation to give deference to military administration, 14 5 the first amendment
protection of the petitioner's homosexual status predominated.' 46 The opinion
carefully noted that the Army had produced no evidence that benShalom had
engaged in homosexual conduct on or off duty.147 In addition to first amend-
ment protection, the court determined that benShalom's personal identity was
protected by the right-of-privacy doctrine. 14 The court concluded that the dis-
charge was arbitrary and capricious because the Army had failed to prove a
nexus between petitioner's homosexual status and her performance in the
military.14 9
Although cases such as Matlovich and benShalom break new ground for
asserting homosexual rights against military policy, 150 they stop short of consti-
tutional protection for homosexual conduct.151 Three recent appellate decisions
have taken a deferential position toward military policies prohibiting homosex-
ual behavior.' 52 Rich v. Secretary of the Army 153 and Hatheway v. Secretary of
140. 591 F.2d 852 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
141. Matlovich, 23 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1252.
142. The district court judge chided the Air Force for "either through a total breakdown in its
own communications or by an intentional trifling with the legal powers, [misleading] two courts and
[confusing] the issues in this long, drawn-out case." Id. at 1251. Subsequent to this decision and a
similar decision concerning Navy regulations, see Berg v. Claytor, 436 F. Supp. 76 (D.D.C. 1977),
vacated and remanded, 591 F.2d 849 (D.C. Cir. 1978), the Department of Defense issued its revised
regulations clarifying the exceptions to the required discharge of homosexual sevicemembers. See
Comment, supra note 8, at 360; supra notes 22, 129.
143. 489 F. Supp. 964 (E.D. Wis. 1980).
144. Petitioner admitted her homosexuality but was not charged with any homosexual conduct.
The Army had discharged her for evidencing "homosexual tendencies, desire, or interest." Id. at
969.
145. Id. at 970-71. The court noted that "[r]estricted judicial review is not, however, the
equivalent of no judicial review." Id. at 971.
146. Id. at 974. The court held that the regulations infringed on petitioner's right to associate
with homosexuals, her right to receive information and ideas about homosexuality, and her freedom
of expression and speech. Id.
147. Id. at 973. The court indicated that the Army had reason to regulate sexual activities
involving servicemembers on the base and servicemembers on duty. Id.
148. Id. at 975-76. The court stated: "If what the United States Supreme Court itself has
termed the right of 'personal privacy'. . . means anything, it should safely encompass an individ-
ual's right to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affect-
ing a person as one's personality, self-image, and indeed, one's very identity." Id. at 975.
This statement reflects the opinion of the majority of authorities who now assert that homosex-
ual preference is determined, almost irreversibly, at an early age. See Baker v. Wade, 553 F. Supp.
1121, 1129 (N.D. Tex. 1982); Lasson, supra note 2, at 59; Richards, supra note 54, at 985-86.
149. benShalom, 489 F. Supp. at 977.
150. See Comment, supra note 8, at 354.
151. See supra notes 142-49 and accompanying text.
152. Rich v. Secretary of the Army, 735 F.2d 1220 (10th Cir. 1984); Hatheway v. Secretary of
the Army, 641 F.2d 1376 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 864 (1981); Beller v. Middendorf, 632
F.2d 788 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 905 (1981).
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the Army 154 follow the balancing approach articulated in Belier v. Mid-
dendorf.155 The Beller court had made it clear "at the outset that th[e] case
[did] not require [the court] to address the question whether consensual private
homosexual conduct is a fundamental right." 156 Instead, the Belier court held
that it must assess the regulations prohibiting homosexual conduct within the
armed services differently from a regulation in a civilian context.1- 7 Balancing
the unique needs of the military against "whatever heightened solicitude is ap-
propriate for consensual private homosexual conduct," 158 the court found the
disputed regulations and discharges constitutional. 15 9 In Hatheway'60 the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reaffirmed this narrow
approach to privacy protection for homosexuals in the armed forces. The court,
however, applied an intermediate level of review on the equal protection ques-
tion,' 6 1 noting that the Navy has a "compelling"'162 interest in maintining a
strong military force, and that homosexual conduct compromises the Navy's
ability to achieve that goal.163 Finally, in Rich the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Tenth Circuit invoked the arguments raised in Belier and Hatheway
supporting military policy. 64 The court accepted the justifications for the
Army's policy of not permitting homosexuals to enlist 16 and found a sufficient
nexus between petitioner's homosexuality and his unsuitability for the Army. 166
Rich characterized the effect of this policy on petitioner's first amendment rights
as "incidental,"' 167 and determined that the special needs of the military made
153. 735 F.2d 1220 (10th Cir. 1984).
154. 641 F.2d 1376 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 864 (1981).
155. 632 F.2d 788, 807 (9th Cir. 1980), cert denied, 452 U.S. 905 (1981). This approach bal-
ances the nature of the individual interest infringed, the importance of the government interest fur-
thered, the degree of infringement, and the sensitivity of the government entity to more carefully
narrowed alternatives.
156. Id. The courts in both Rich and Hatheway also declined to decide this unsettled question.
See Rich, 735 F.2d at 1228; Hatheway, 641 F.2d at 1381.
157. Belier, 632 F.2d at 810; see also Comment, supra note 8, at 366 (interpreting Belier as
decision on military policy only).
158. Belier, 632 F.2d at 810.
159. Id. at 812
160. The court-martial against petitioner in Hatheway was based on homosexual sodomy com-
mitted on the Army base. In discussing the right of privacy, the court found that because petitioner
committed the acts in front of two other people, his claim to privacy was minimized. Hatheway, 641
F.2d at 1384.
161. Id. at 1382. TheBeller opinion described its intermediate-level review of Army regulations
as lying somewhere between the lowest level of scrutiny and strict scrutiny. Belier, 632 F.2d at
808-09; see supra note 58.
162. Although the court only needed to find an "important" government interest served by the
regulation, the court found a "compelling" interest. Hatheway, 641 F.2d at 1382.
163. Id.
164. Rich, 735 F.2d at 1227-29. Although the basis of the holding was petitioner's false enlist-
ment, the court decided the constitutionality of the Army's prohibition on homosexuality. Id. at
1226-29.
165. Id. at 1227-28 n.7. The Army offered evidence to show that homosexual servicemembers
would be detrimental to good order, discipline, morale, and military effectiveness because their pres-
ence would cause tension between homosexuals and heterosexuals forced to live and work together,
and would have an adverse impact on recruiting efforts.
166. Id. at 1228 n.7. The court claimed that it need not make a case-by-case nexus determina-
tion if there was a sufficient nexus between the policies and the Army's purpose.
167. Id. at 1229.
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such restrictions permissible. 168
In contrast with these decisions from other courts of appeals, Dronenburg
limits the constitutional right of privacy for any homosexual conduct. 169 The
court emphasized that Supreme Court right-of-privacy decisions have involved
marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and ed-
ucation. 170 In the Dronenburg court's view, such matters clearly do not cover a
right to engage in homosexual activities. 171 Although the court correctly char-
acterized the Supreme Court's articulation of "fundamental rights" as "less pre-
scriptions of a mode of reasoning than they are conclusions about particular
rights enunciated," 172 it deduced its own overstated conclusion that definition of
homosexual conduct as a fundamental right necessarily implies that "any and
all" private sexual conduct is protected. 173
Discussing the problem of defining a fundamental right, however, does not
resolve the issue. Although judicial restraint is necessary to prevent judges from
roaming "where unguided speculation might take them,"' 174 the Dronenburg
opinion takes this admonition too literally. The court ignored significant case
law and factors considered in recent opinions that should have guided its analy-
sis of the case. 175
168. Id. (citing Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733 (1974)). The court, however, did note a recent case
in which first amendment principles outweighed the military needs. Matthews v. Marsh, No. 82-
0216 (D. Me. April 3, 1984), cited in Rich, 735 F.2d at 1229.
169. Dronenburg, 741 F.2d at 1395-96.
170. Id.
171. Id.; see also Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238, 244 (1976) (freedom of choice in matter of
personal appearance not equal to protection in matters of procreation, marriage, and family life);
Hafen, The Constitutional Status of Marriage, Kinship, and Sexual Privacy-Balancing the Individ-
ual and Social Interests, 81 MICH. L. REv. 463 (1983) (supporting limitation on right-to-privacy
cases).
172. Dronenburg, 741 F.2d at 1396. In Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961), Justice Harlan
stated:
Due Process has not been reduced to any formula; its content cannot be determined by
reference to any code. The best that can be said is that through the course of this Court's
decisions it has represented the balance which our Nation, built upon postulates of respect
for the liberty of the individual, has struck between that liberty and the demands of organ-
ized society.
Id. at 542 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
173. Dronenburg, 741 F.2d at 1396. Dronenburg sought qualified protection for all consensual,
private sexual conduct between adults. See Opening Brief for Appellant at 19-22, Dronenburg; see
also Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney, 403 F. Supp. 1199, 1204-05 (E.D. Va. 1975) (Merhige, J.,
dissenting) (right of privacy only protects nonpublic activity between consenting adults), aff'd mem.,
425 U.S. 901 (1976); Lasson, supra note 2, at 57 (privacy right must be limited so that a private
activity does not affect the public welfare adversely).
174. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 548 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
175. In a harsh dissent from the denial of a rehearing en banc, Judge Robinson criticized the
Dronenburg opinion for conducting a "general spring cleaning of constitutional law." Dronenburg
v. Zech, 746 F.2d 1579, 1580 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Robinson, J., dissenting), denying reh'g to 741 F.2d
1388 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
Instead of conscientiously attempting to discern the principles underlying the Supreme
Court's privacy decisions, the panel has in effect thrown up their hands and decided to
confine these decisions to their facts. Such an approach to "interpretation" is as clear an
abdication of judicial responsibility as would be a decision upholding all privacy claims the
Supreme Court has not expressly rejected.
Id. at 1580.
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First, Dronenburg oversimplifies the scope of the constitutional right of pri-
vacy by cataloguing selected Supreme Court decisions 176 and finding no holding
expressly protecting homosexual conduct. 177 The court concentrated on cases
protecting rights within marriage or within traditional family relationships. 178
Other opinions, however, strongly emphasize the impact of Stanley,179 Eisen-
stadt, and Roe' 80 and find a broader principle supporting protection for an indi-
vidual's right to make intimate personal decisions. 181 Such opinions interpret
Stanley as protecting any consensual sexual behavior within the privacy of the
home.182 These opinions also interpret Eisenstadt and Roe as expanding the
right of privacy beyond marital intimacy to include traditionally unacceptable
adult relationships. 8 3 By refusing to evaluate the underlying principles in the
privacy cases, the Dronenburg court essentially refused to judge any claim of
constitutional protection under the right of privacy until the Supreme Court
explicitly decides an identical issue. 184
Second, the military setting of Dronenburg's case provided the court with
an obvious analytic framework 185 that the court relegated to minor impor-
tance. 186 The separate community doctrine supported by a majority of the
Supreme Court allows lower courts to give greater deference to military restric-
tions on individual rights.' 8 7 Without deciding whether all private consensual
homosexual conduct falls under constitutional protection, the courts of appeals
for the Ninth and Tenth Circuits have upheld military regulations prohibiting
homosexual conduct by members of the armed services. 188 Dronenburg not only
fails to cite any of these recent opinions, but also fails to follow their narrow
holdings, which limit consideration of homosexual rights to the restrictions im-
176. See supra notes 38-52 and accompanying text.
177. See supra notes 53-55 and accompanying text.
178. Professor Hafen's definition of "traditional" family relationships involves a blood-marriage-
adoption test. Childbearing and childrearing cases would fall within this category. See Hafen, supra
note 171, at 527.
179. The Dronenburg opinion completely omitted any discussion of Stanley; Dronenburg, how-
ever, had noted the case as one of his chief authorities. Opening Brief for Appellant at vi,
Dronenburg.
180. Professor Hafen noted that the contraception and abortion decisions go the furthest in de-
parting from the blood-marriage-adoption test because they protect unmarried individuals with un-
born, prospective children. Hafen, supra note 171, at 527.
181. See, eg., Baker v. Wade, 553 F. Supp. 1121, 1141 (N.D. Tex. 1982) ("right of privacy does
extend to private, voluntary, intimate relationships"); benShalom v. Secretary of the Army, 489 F.
Supp. 964, 975 (E.D. Wis. 1980) (Constitution protects the "privacy of the integral components of
one's personality"); Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney, 403 F. Supp. 1199, 1204 (E.D. Va. 1975)
(Merhige, J., dissenting) (due process clause protects the right to select consenting adult sexual part-
ners), aff'd mem, 425 U.S. 901 (1976); see also Karst, supra note 66, at 629 (freedom of "intimate
association" involves as close a personal relationship as a marriage or family relationship); Richards,
supra note 54, at 964-72 (fusing autonomy and equality as values underlying human rights concept).
182. See supra note 82.
183. See supra note 121.
184. See supra note 56.
185. See supra notes 87-105 and accompanying text.
186. The court discussed the military necessity idea only as support for the Navy regulation.
The court, however, did not expressly limit its decision to the military context. Dronenburg, 741
F.2d at 1392, 1398.
187. See supra notes 89-90 and accompanying text.
188. See supra notes 152-68 and accompanying text.
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posed by the military's separate community. 1 9
Last, the Dronenburg opinion gave little attention to the facts of the case.190
In finding a rational relation between the homosexual prohibition and the legiti-
mate interests of the Navy, the court briefly speculated on the harmful effects of
Dronenburg's conduct.191 The holding, however, does not require the Navy to
prove any actual effect of Dronenburg's relationship or of homosexual conduct
in general on the efficient operation of the Navy.192 If Dronenburg had been a
civil servant working in a federal agency, the court could not have upheld his
discharge without some proof that his homosexual conduct affected his job fit-
ness.19 3 Some cases reviewing military discharges require the same showing of a
nexus between homosexuality and military fitness. 194 Dronenburg might have
difficulty arguing against a showing that his conduct did affect his performance
in the Navy;195 the court, however, presumably would require no such showing
under any circumstances. 196
In short, the Dronenburg court handed down the most restrictive decision
in the recent development of case law concerning the rights of homosexuals. By
expanding the analysis beyond the military context, the Dronenburg decision
broadly affects all cases seeking right-of-privacy protection for homosexual per-
sons. The court failed to follow its own warning on judicial restraint and de-
cided larger issues in areas of constitutional protection for private conduct that
should have remained separate from the military setting of this case. 197 Signifi-
cantly, the opinion discussed no recent lower federal court decision involving
homosexual rights in either a military or a civilian context.1 98 By omitting any
consideration of contemporary homosexual rights case law, the court presented
a holding that is out of step with cases expanding legal protection for homosex-
189. Rich, 735 F.2d at 1228; Hathaway, 641 F.2d at 1382; Belier, 632 F.2d at 810. Although the
Dronenburg court cited Belier at the very end of its decision, it did not limit its holding to the
military facts. Dronenburg, 741 F.2d at 1398.
190. The court mentioned the underlying facts only once after its initial fact summary. See
Dronenburg, 741 F.2d at 1398.
191. Id.
192. Id.; see supra note 59.
193. See supra notes 123-25 and accompanying text.
194. benShalom v. Secretary of the Army, 489 F. Supp. at 977; Doe v. Chafee, 355 F. Supp. at
115; see supra notes 132-35, 143-49 and accompanying text.
195. Dronenburg's activities in the Navy barracks would violate even the more liberal test estab-
lished in benShalom. benShalom, 489 F. Supp. at 973.
196. Dronenburg v. Zech, 746 F.2d 1579, 1581 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Robinson, J., dissenting) (equal
protection principles require analysis of the Navy's mandatory discharge for any homosexual con-
duct because problems arising from heterosexual conduct are considered on a case-by-case basis),
denying reh'g to 741 F.2d 1388 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
197. If followed, the opinion would cut against decisions in areas of criminal sodomy and public
employment that expand the right of privacy in civilian contexts. See supra notes 106-26 and accom-
panying text.
198. The opinion cited Matlovich v. Secretary of the Air Force, 591 F.2d 852 (D.C. Cir. 1978) in
examining a jurisdictional question, Dronenburg, 741 F.2d at 1390, but failed to follow its subse-
quent history. See Matlovich v. Secretary of the Air Force, 23 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1251
(D.D.C. 1980) (on remand) (Air Force failed to justify regulations on homosexuality). The court
also cited Belier v. Middendorf, 632 F.2d 788 (9th Cir.), cert denied, 452 U.S. 905 (1980), but offers
no discussion of Beller's analysis. Dronenburg, 741 F.2d at 1398.
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ual individuals in areas such as criminal law and public employment. 199 Among
the armed services decisions, the Dronenburg court's treatment of the right of
privacy blurs distinctions drawn by other courts between broad protection for
homosexual status and a more restrictive postion on homosexual conduct. 200
Dronenburg is not the best test case to determine whether the right of pri-
vacy protects private consensual homosexual behavior between adults.20 1 Be-
sides posing a challenge to military regulations, the case involves activities
occurring on military premises and a relationship between a petty officer and a
lower ranked enlisted man.202 The primary drawback of the court of appeals'
decision is the court's failure to limit its analysis to treatment of the weaknesses
in the case.203 At the very least, the case should have affirmed Dronenburg's
discharge based on judicial deference to military decisions. As it now reads,
however, Dronenburg threatens to cut short any assertion of a right of privacy
for homosexual individuals.
KATHERINE M. ALLEN
199. See supra note 197.
200. See, eg., benShalom v. Secretary of the Army, 489 F. Supp. 964 (E.D. Wis. 1980) (where no
showing of homosexual conduct, discharge based on petitioner's homosexual preference was uncon-
stitutional); Matthews v. Marsh, No. 82-0216 (D.C. Me. April 3, 1984) (where no evidence of homo-
sexual conduct, exclusion from ROTC program violated first amendment rights of homosexual
student), noted in 52 U.S.L.W. 2569.
201. It is no secret that "[the] tendency in the development of new constitutional doctrine is for a
clear-cut paradigm case to be identified, and for institutional litigators, scholars, and other lawyers
to research for analogies that are 'close enough' in functional or doctrinal terms to justify application
of a similar principle." Karst, supra note 66, at 662.
202. The court particularly emphasized that the activity had taken place on the base and had
been with a less experienced serviceman. Dronenburg, 741 F.2d at 1389, 1398.
203. Although the full bench of the court of appeals denied a rehearing for this case, four justices
strongly objected to the decision and dissented from the denial of rehearing en banc. See
Dronenburg v. Zech, 746 F.2d 1579, 1580 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Robinson, J., dissenting).
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